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Abstract
Whether in groups of humans or groups of computer
agents, collaboration is most effective between individ-
uals who have the ability to coordinate on a joint strat-
egy for collective action. However, in general a rational
actor will only intend to coordinate if that actor believes
the other group members have the same intention. This
circular dependence makes rational coordination diffi-
cult in uncertain environments if communication be-
tween actors is unreliable and no prior agreements have
been made. An important normative question with re-
gard to coordination in these ad hoc settings is therefore
how one can come to believe that other actors will co-
ordinate, and with regard to systems involving humans,
an important empirical question is how humans arrive at
these expectations. We introduce an exact algorithm for
computing the infinitely recursive hierarchy of graded
beliefs required for rational coordination in uncertain
environments, and we introduce a novel mechanism for
multiagent coordination that uses it. Our algorithm is
valid in any environment with a finite state space, and
extensions to certain countably infinite state spaces are
likely possible. We test our mechanism for multiagent
coordination as a model for human decisions in a simple
coordination game using existing experimental data. We
then explore via simulations whether modeling humans
in this way may improve human-agent collaboration.
Forming shared plans that support mutually beneficial be-
havior within a group is central to collaborative social inter-
action and collective intelligence (Grosz and Kraus 1996).
Indeed, many common organizational practices are designed
to facilitate shared knowledge of the structure and goals of
organizations, as well as mutual recognition of the roles
that individuals in the organizations play. Once teams be-
come physically separated and responsiveness or frequency
of communication declines, the challenge of forming shared
plans increases. Part of this difficulty is fundamentally com-
putational. In theory, coming to a fully mutually recognized
agreement on even a simple action plan among two choices
can be literally impossible if communication is even mildly
unreliable, even if an arbitrary amount of communication is
allowed (Halpern and Moses 1990; Lynch 1996).
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This problem is well-studied within the AI literature (e.g.,
(Gmytrasiewicz and Durfee 1992)), though the core diffi-
culties still manifest in contemporary research on “ad hoc
coordination”—collaborative multiagent planning with pre-
viously unknown teammates (Stone et al. 2010). However,
surprisingly little is known about the strategies that humans
use to overcome the difficulties of coordination (Thomas et
al. 2014). Understanding how and when people try to co-
ordinate is critical to furthering our understanding of human
group behavior, as well as to the design of agents for human-
agent collectives (Jennings et al. 2014). Existing attempts
at modeling human coordination have focused either on un-
structured predictive models (e.g., (Frieder, Lin, and Kraus
2012)) or bounded depth socially recursive reasoning mod-
els (e.g., (Gal and Pfeffer 2008; Yoshida, Dolan, and Friston
2008)), but there is reason to believe that these accounts miss
important aspects of human coordination.
One concept that appears repeatedly in formal treatments
of coordination but has not appeared meaningfully in empir-
ical modeling is common knowledge. Two agents have com-
mon knowledge if both agents have infinitely nested knowl-
edge of the other agent’s knowledge of a proposition, i.e.
the first agent knows the second agent knows, the first agent
knows the second agent knows the first agent knows, etc.
Common knowledge has been shown to be necessary for ex-
act coordination (Halpern and Moses 1990), and a proba-
bilistic generalization of common knowledge, called com-
mon p-belief, has been been shown to be necessary for ap-
proximate coordination (Monderer and Samet 1989). While
these notions are clearly important normatively, it is not en-
tirely clear how important they are empirically in human co-
ordination. Indeed, supposing that humans are able to men-
tally represent an infinitely recursive belief state seems a
priori implausible, and the need to represent and infer this
infinite recursive belief state has also been a barrier to em-
pirically testing models involving common knowledge.
Nevertheless, building on the existing normative results,
a group of researchers recently designed a set of experi-
ments to test whether people are able to recognize situations
in which common knowledge might obtain (Thomas et al.
2014) (hereafter referred to as the “Thomas experiments”).
These researchers argued that people do possess a distinct
mental representation of common knowledge by showing
that people will attempt to coordinate more often in situa-
tions where common knowledge can be inferred. However,
this previous work did not formalize this claim in a model or
rigorously test it against plausible alternative computational
models of coordination. This existing empirical work there-
fore leaves open several important scientific questions that a
modeling effort can help address. In particular: How might
people mentally represent common p-belief? Do people rea-
son about graded levels of common p-belief, or just “suffi-
ciently high” common p-belief? Finally, what computational
processes could people use to infer common p-belief?
In this work we use a previously established fixed point
characterization of common p-belief (Monderer and Samet
1989) to formulate a novel model of human coordination. In
finite state spaces this characterization yields an exact finite
representation of common p-belief, which we use to develop
an efficient algorithm for computing common p-belief. This
algorithm allows us to simulate models that rely on common
p-belief. Because of the normative importance of common
p-belief in coordination problems, our algorithm may also be
independently useful for coordination in artificial multiagent
systems. We show using data from the Thomas experiments
that this model provides a better account of human decisions
than three alternative models in a simple coordination task.
Finally, we show via simulations based on the data from the
Thomas experiments that modeling humans in this way may
improve human-agent coordination.
1 Background
We first provide a description of the coordination task we
will study in this paper: the well-known coordinated attack
problem. We then provide an overview of the formal defini-
tions of common knowledge and common p-belief, and their
relationship to the coordinated attack problem.
1.1 Coordinated Attack Problem
The coordination task that we study in this paper is alterna-
tively called the coordinated attack problem, the two gen-
erals problem, or the email game. The original formula-
tion of this task was posed in the literature on distributed
computer systems to illustrate the impossibility of achieving
consensus among distributed computer processors that use
an unreliable message-passing system (Halpern and Moses
1990), and the problem was later adapted by economists to
a game theoretic context (Rubinstein 1989). Here we focus
on the game theoretic adaptation, as this formulation is more
amenable to decision-theoretic modeling and thus more rel-
evant for modeling human behavior.1
In this task the world can be in one of two states, x = 1
or x = 0. The state of the world determines which of two
games two players will play together. The payoff matrices
for these two games are as follows (a > c > max(b, d)):
x = 1 A B
A a,a b,c
B c,b c,c
x = 0 A B
A d,d b,c
B c,b c,c
1Our exposition largely assumes familiarity with rudimentary
game theory, and familiarity with measure-theoretic probability as
it appears in incomplete information games.
The players receive the optimal payoff if they coordinate on
both playing A when x = 1, but playing A is risky. Playing
A is inferior to playing B if x = 0 or if there is a mismatch
between the players’ actions. Playing B is safe with a sure
payoff of c. Thus in order for it to be rational to play A, a
player must believe with sufficient confidence both that the
world state is x = 1 and that the other player will play A.
1.2 Common p-Belief
In order for a player to believe the other player will play A
in this game, it is not enough for that player to believe that
the other player knows x = 1. If the second player does not
believe that the first player knows x = 1, then the second
player will not try to coordinate. Therefore the first player
must also at least believe that the second player believes the
first player knows x = 1. However, it turns out even this
amount of knowledge does not suffice. In fact, an infinite hi-
erarchy of recursive belief is needed (Morris and Shin 1997).
This infinite hierarchy of beliefs has been formalized using
a construct called common p-belief, which we now define.
Using standard definitions from game theory, we de-
fine a two-player finite Bayesian game to be a tuple
((Ω, µ, (Π0,Π1)), (A0,A1), (u0, u1)) consisting of a finite
state space Ω = {ω1, . . . , ω|Ω|}, a probability measure µ
defined over that state space, the information partition Πi of
each player i, the action setAi of each player, and the utility
function ui of each player. Elements of Ω are called states,
and subsets of Ω are called events. For a given world state ω
and player i the partition of Ω, Πi, uniquely specifies the be-
liefs of player i in the form of posterior probabilities. Πi(ω),
which indicates the unique element of Πi containing ω, can
be thought of as the observation that player i receives when
the true state ω occurs. Specifically for any event E ⊆ Ω,
µ(E |Πi(ω)) is the probability that player i assigns to E
having occurred given ω has occurred. As a shorthand, we
write Pi(E |ω) = µ(E |Πi(ω)). Using another common
shorthand, we will treat propositions and events satisfying
those propositions interchangeably. For example, in the co-
ordinated attack problem we will be interested in whether
there is “common p-belief” that x = 1, which will refer to
common p-belief in the event C = {ω ∈ Ω : x(ω) = 1},
where x formally is a random variable mapping Ω→ {0, 1}.
Following (Dalkiran et al. 2012), we say that player i p-
believes2 an event E at ω if Pi(E |ω) ≥ p. An event E is
said to be p-evident if for all ω ∈ E and for all players i,
player i p-believes E at ω. In a slight divergence from the
standard terminology of this literature, we say an event E
is super-p-evident if for all ω ∈ E and for all players i,
Pi(E |ω) > p (the only difference being strict inequality).
We say there is common p-belief in an event C at state ω if
there exists a p-evident eventE with ω ∈ E, and for all ω′ ∈
E and all players i, player i p-believes C at ω′. Common
knowledge is defined as common p-belief for p = 1.
A critically important result of (Monderer and Samet
1989) states that this definition of common p-belief is equiv-
2We use an italicized “p” when referring to specific values of
p-belief and a non-italicized “p” when referring to the terms in gen-
eral.
alent to a more intuitive infinitely recursive formulation. The
importance of this definition of common p-belief is therefore
that it provides a fixed point characterization of common p-
belief strictly in terms of beliefs about events rather than
directly in terms of beliefs about other players. When Ω is
finite, common p-belief can thus be represented in terms of a
finite set of states, rather than an infinite hierarchy of beliefs.
2 Models
We now describe four strategies for coordination in the co-
ordinated attack game we study. Two of these strategies in-
volve the computation of p-evident events and common p-
belief, which we will use to test whether human coordina-
tion behavior could be explained in terms of reasoning about
p-evident events. The other two strategies serve as baselines.
2.1 Rational p-Belief
The first strategy we consider represents an agent who max-
imizes expected utility at an equilibrium point of the co-
ordinated attack problem we study. The strategy is imple-
mented as follows: player i plays action A if and only if the
player believes with probability at least p∗ = c−ba−b that both
players have common p∗-belief that x = 1. This strategy
forms an equilibrium of the coordinated attack problem if
p∗ > Pi(x = 1) and if evidence that x = 1 always leads
to certain belief that x = 1, i.e. Pi(x = 1 |ω) > Pi(x =
1) ⇒ Pi(x = 1 |ω) = 1 for all ω. These conditions will
be satisfied by the specific state spaces and payoffs we use
to represent the Thomas experiments. We call this model the
rational p-belief strategy. The proof that this strategy forms
an equilibrium, including a derivation for the specific form
of p∗, is included in our supplementary materials.3
2.2 Matched p-Belief
The second strategy we consider is a novel probabilistic
relaxation of the rational p-belief strategy. Humans have
been shown to exhibit a behavior called probability match-
ing in many decision-making settings (Herrnstein 1961;
Vulkan 2000). Probability matching consists of taking the
probability p that a decision is the best decision available,
and choosing to make that decision with probability p. While
probability matching is not utility maximizing, it can be
viewed as rational if players are performing sample-based
Bayesian inference and if taking samples is costly (Vul et
al. 2014). Motivated by this frequently observed behavior,
we propose a model we call the matched p-belief strategy.
A player i using this strategy chooses action A at ω with
probability p equal to the maximal common p-belief that the
player perceives at ω, i.e. the largest value such that i p-
believes at ω that there is common p-belief that x = 1.
3A version of our paper that includes the supplementary
materials (as well as any post-publication corrections to the
main text) is available in multiple locations online, includ-
ing at http://people.csail.mit.edu/pkrafft/papers/krafft-et-al-2016-
modeling-human-ad-hoc-coordination.pdf.
2.3 Iterated Maximization
Next we consider a well-known model of boundedly rational
behavior sometimes called a “level-k” depth of reasoning
model. This family of models has been shown to be consis-
tent with human behavior in a diversity of settings, including
some coordination games (e.g., (Yoshida, Dolan, and Friston
2008)), and hence is a strong baseline. Since the term “level-
k” is used for many slightly different models, we call our in-
stantiation of this model the iterated maximization strategy.
This strategy assumes that players have a certain fixed level
of recursive social reasoning k. A player using the level-k
iterated maximization strategy chooses the action that max-
imizes that player’s expected utility when playing with a
player using the level-(k − 1) strategy. The level-0 player
takes action A at ω if Pi(x = 1 |ω) > c−ba−b . This level-0
strategy corresponds to the player maximizing expected util-
ity assuming the player can control the actions of both play-
ers, or equivalently that the optimal joint action is taken ac-
cording to that player’s beliefs. While in general the predic-
tions of level-k models depend strongly on the specification
of the level-0 strategy, in informal exploration we found that
the qualitative conclusions of our work are robust to whether
we instead specify the level-0 strategy as always playing A
or choosing between A and B uniformly randomly.
2.4 Iterated Matching
Finally, we also consider a less common depth of reason-
ing model that combines the iterated maximization strategy
with probability matching behavior, which we call iterated
matching. Like the iterated maximization strategy, this strat-
egy assumes that players have a certain fixed level of recur-
sive social reasoning k. However, instead of choosing the
action that maximizes expected utility, a level-k player us-
ing the iterated matching strategy chooses to take action A
with probability equal to that player’s belief that x = 1,
times the expected probability that a level-(k−1) companion
player would playA. The level-0 player probability matches
on Pi(x = 1 |ω).
3 Algorithms
In this section we present the algorithms we use to imple-
ment each of the models we consider. To the best of our
knowledge the existing literature on common p-belief has
yet to offer algorithms for computing common p-belief (or
in our case the perceived maximal common p-belief) for
a given world state and observation model. This computa-
tion is central to the rational and matched p-belief strategies.
Hence we offer the first fully computational account of co-
ordination via reasoning about p-evident events. Algorithms
for iterated reasoning are straightforward and well-known.
The challenge in developing an algorithm for computing
a player’s perception of the maximal common p-belief is
avoiding enumeration over all exponentially many possible
subsets of Ω. While it is straightforward to evaluate whether
a particular given event is p-evident, the definition of com-
mon p-belief requires only the existence of some such event.
Computing perceived maximal common p-belief therefore
Algorithm 1 common p belief(C, i, ω)
E := Ω; F := Ω
while Pi(F |ω) > 0 do
p := evidence level(F,C)
E := F
F := super p evident(E,C, p)
p := evidence level(E,C)
return p
Algorithm 2 evidence level(E, C)
return minω∈E min belief(E,C, ω)
requires jointly searching over values of p and over sub-
sets of Ω. We leverage the generic mathematical structure
of p-evident events in finite state spaces in order to develop
an exact algorithm that avoids enumerating all subsets. Our
algorithm only requires a search that is polynomial in the
size of the state space. Of course, the state spaces in many
problems are often themselves exponential in some underly-
ing parameter variables, and hence future improvements on
this algorithm would be desirable. Extensions to at least cer-
tain countably infinite or continuous state spaces are likely
possible as well, such as perhaps by refining the search to
only consider events that have non-zero probability given
the player’s observations.
3.1 Computing Information Partitions
Our algorithms require access to the information partitions
of each player. However, directly specifying the information
partitions that people have in a naturalistic setting, such as
in the data we use from the Thomas experiments, is diffi-
cult. Instead, we take the approach of specifying a plausible
generative probabilistic world model, and we then construct
the information partitions from this factored representation
via a straightforward algorithm. The generative world model
specifies the pieces of information, or “observations”, that
each player receives. The algorithm for generating informa-
tion partitions, which is specified precisely in our supple-
mentary materials, consists of iterating over all combina-
tions of random values of variables in the generative world
model, treating each such combination as a state in Ω, and
for each player grouping together the states that yield iden-
tical observations.
3.2 Computing Common p-Belief
Algorithms 1-4 present the functions needed to compute per-
ceived maximal common p-belief. Formally, given a player
i, a particular state ω, and an event C, Algorithm 1 com-
putes the largest value p for which player i p-believes that
there is common p-belief in C. Note that it is insufficient to
compute the largest value of p for which there is common
p-belief in C at ω, since in general at state ω player i only
knows that the event Πi(ω) has occurred, not that ω specif-
ically has occurred. Relatedly, note that while Algorithm 1
takes ω as input for convenience, the algorithm only depends
on Πi(ω), and hence could be executed by a player.
Algorithm 3 min belief(E, C, ω)
return mini∈{0,1}min(Pi(E |ω), Pi(C |ω))
Algorithm 4 super p evident(E, C, p)
while E has changed do
if ∃ ω ∈ E : min belief(E,C, ω) ≤ p then
E := E \ {ω}
return E
Formal proofs of the correctness of these algorithms are
included in our supplementary materials. The basic logic of
the algorithms is to maintain a candidate p-evident event E,
and to gradually remove elements from E to make it more
p-evident until a point where player i believes the event to be
impossible because the elements of the event are no longer
consistent with that player’s observations. By only remov-
ing elements that either cause E to be unlikely or cause C to
be unlikely, we are guaranteed to arrive at a more p-evident
event at each iteration, and one that preserves belief inC. By
starting with E as the entire state space, the final candidate
event must be the largest, most p-evident event that player
i p-believes at state ω in which C is common p-belief. This
algorithm can also be viewed as traversing a unique nested
sequence of maximally evident events (independent of i and
ω) induced by C and the structure of (Ω, µ, (Π0,Π1)), halt-
ing at the first event in this sequence that does not include
any elements of Πi(ω).
The rational p-belief strategy consists of player i taking
action A if common p belief(x = 1, i, ω) > c−ba−b . The
matched p-belief strategy consists of player i choosing A
with probability common p belief(x = 1, i, ω).
3.3 Iterated Reasoning
We now present our algorithms for the iterated reasoning
strategies. For level k > 0, given a player i and a state ω, the
iterated maximization strategy computes
fki (ω) = 1
( ∑
ω′∈Πi(ω)
Pi(ω
′ |ω)
(
Pi(x = 1 |ω′)fk−11−i (ω′)a
+ Pi(x = 0 |ω′)fk−11−i (ω′)d+
(
1− fk−11−i (ω′)
)
b
)
> c
)
,
where 1() is the indicator function, and f0i (ω) = 1(Pi(x =
1 |ω) > c−ba−b ). If fki (ω) = 1, then player i plays A, and oth-
erwise player i plays B. For the iterated matching strategy,
qki (ω) = Pi(x = 1 |ω) ·
∑
ω′∈Πi(ω)
Pi(ω
′ |ω)qk−11−i (ω′).
A is then played with probability qki , q
0
i = Pi(x = 1 |ω).
4 Data
We now present the data we use for our empirical results.
The dataset comes from the Thomas experiments (Thomas
et al. 2014). These experiments presented participants with a
stylized coordinated attack problem couched in a story about
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Figure 1: Data from the Thomas experiments and the predictions of each of the models we consider.
the butcher and the baker of a town. In their story, these mer-
chants can either work together to produce hot dogs, or they
can work separately to produce chicken wings and dinner
rolls, respectively. The merchants can sell chicken wings and
dinner rolls separately for a constant profit of c each on any
day, but the profit of hot dogs varies from day-to-day. The
merchants make a profit of a each if x = 1 on a particular
day or d if x = 0. There is also a loudspeaker that sometimes
publicly announces the prices of hot dogs, and a messenger
who runs around the town delivering messages. The experi-
ments had four different knowledge conditions that specified
the information that participants received:
1. Private Knowledge: “The Messenger Boy [sic] has not
seen the Butcher today, so he cannot tell you anything
about what the Butcher knows.”
2. Secondary Knowledge: “The Messenger Boy says he
stopped by the butcher shop before coming to your bak-
ery. He tells you that the Butcher knows what today’s hot
dog price is. However, he says that he forgot to mention to
the Butcher that he was coming to see you, so the Butcher
is not aware that you know today’s hot dog price.”
3. Tertiary Knowledge: “The Messenger Boy mentions that
he is heading over to the butcher shop, and will let the
Butcher know today’s price as well. The Messenger Boy
will also tell the Butcher that he just came from your bak-
ery and told you the price. However, the Messenger Boy
will not inform the Butcher that he told you he would be
heading over there. So, while the Butcher is aware that
you know today’s price, he is not aware that you know
that he knows that.”
4. Common Knowledge: “The loudspeaker broadcast the
market price . . . The messenger boy did not come by. Be-
cause the market price was broadcast on the loudspeaker,
the Butcher knows today’s price, and he knows that you
know this information as well.”
After being shown this information as well as additional
information indicating that x = 1, the participants were
asked whether they would like to try to make hot dogs or
not. The dataset from this experiment is visualized in Figure
1. Since the researchers provided evidence that the behavior
of participants in their two-player experiments was invariant
to payoffs, here we focus on their first payoff condition, in
which a = 1.1, b = 0, c = 1, and d = 0.4.
We use this dataset to test whether the coordination strate-
gies we have described are good models of human coordina-
tion in this setting. In order to be able to generate predictions
for these models, we must determine a state space that repre-
sents the story in the Thomas experiments. We designed the
following two probabilistic generative world models (one
for the messenger, and one for the loudspeaker) to be consis-
tent with a reading of the knowledge conditions from those
experiments. The observe(i,o) function indicates that player
i observes o.
Messenger:
x ∼ Bernoulli(δ)
visit0 ∼ Bernoulli(0.5)
visit1 ∼ Bernoulli(0.5)
tell plan0 ∼ visit0 ∧ Bernoulli(0.5)
tell plan1 ∼ visit1 ∧ Bernoulli(0.5)
if visit0:
observe(0, x)
if tell plan0:
observe(0, (visit1, tell plan1))
if visit1:
observe(1, (x, visit0))
if tell plan1:
observe(1, tell plan0)
Loudspeaker:
x ∼ Bernoulli(δ)
broadcast ∼ Bernoulli(0.5)
if broadcast:
observe(0, x), observe(1, x)
These models share a free parameter δ. We take δ = 0.25.
This setting provides a closer fit to the empirical data than
the maximum entropy setting of δ = 0.5. We interpret state-
ments that one player is “not aware” as meaning that the
player could have been made aware, and assign a maximum
entropy probability of 0.5 to these events.
The state spaces corresponding to these world models
consist of the sets of all possible combinations of vari-
ables in the models’ generative processes: (x, visit0, visit1,
tell plan0, tell plan0) for Ωmessenger and (x, broadcast) for
Ωloudspeaker. The generative processes also uniquely spec-
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Figure 2: The mean-squared error of each model’s predic-
tions on the Thomas experiments’ data.
ify probability measures over each state space. The knowl-
edge conditions correspond to the following states. Pri-
vate: (1, 1, 0, 1, 0) ∈ Ωmessenger, Secondary: (1, 1, 1, 0, 1) ∈
Ωmessenger, Tertiary: (1, 1, 1, 1, 0) ∈ Ωmessenger, and Com-
mon Knowledge: (1, 1) ∈ Ωloudspeaker. The participants act
as player 0 in all but the secondary condition. Due to high
ambiguity in the wording of the private knowledge condi-
tion, we considered two plausible readings. Either the mes-
senger is communicating an intention to not visit the other
player, or the messenger is being unhelpful in not offering
any information about the messenger’s plan. By using the
state (1, 1, 0, 1, 0) we assume the first interpretation. This
interpretation results in a better empirical fit.
5 Results
We now present our empirical results. We first examine
the predictions of each of the coordination strategies we
consider given the generative processes representing the
Thomas experiments. We then examine the extent to which
a computer agent equipped with the best fitting model of hu-
man coordination is able to achieve higher payoffs in a sim-
ulated human-agent coordination problem. All of our code
is available online at https://github.com/pkrafft/modeling-
human-ad-hoc-coordination.
5.1 Model Comparison
To perform model comparison we compute the probability
of choosing A that each model predicts given our formal
representations of each of the four knowledge conditions.
We then compare these predicted probabilities to the actual
probabilities observed in the Thomas experiments. For the
two iterated reasoning models we use a grid search over
[0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5] to find the best fitting k for each model (ul-
timately k = 1 in iterated maximization and k = 3 in iter-
ated matching). The specific predictions of each model are
shown in Figure 1. As shown in Figure 2, the matched p-
belief model achieves the lowest mean-squared error. Quali-
tatively, the most striking aspect of the data that the matched
p-belief model successfully captures is the similarity in the
probability of coordination between the secondary and ter-
tiary knowledge conditions. The two models that involve
maximizing agents (rational p-belief and iterated maximiza-
tion) both make predictions that are too extreme. The iter-
ated matching model offers a competitive second place fit
to the data, but it fails to capture the similarity between the
middle two knowledge conditions.
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Figure 3: Performance of agents in our simulated human-
agent coordination experiments. A strategy’s marginal value
is the expected sum of payoffs the strategy obtained in each
of the four knowledge conditions, minus the payoffs that
could have been obtained by always playing B.
The reason that the matched p-belief model makes good
predictions for the two middle conditions is that the player
in both of those conditions has the same amount of uncer-
tainty appearing at some level of that player’s infinite re-
cursive hierarchy of interpersonal beliefs. Common p-belief
essentially represents a minimum taken over all these levels,
and thus the common p-belief in each of those two condi-
tions is the same. The rational p-belief model is aware of the
uncertainty at higher levels of recursive belief, but its pre-
dictions are too coarse due to the assumption of utility max-
imization. An interesting avenue for future work is to ex-
amine whether the rational p-belief model can be relaxed in
any other way to allow for intermediate predictions, such as
by allowing for heterogeneity in interpretations of the world
model across agents. It is possible that the matched p-belief
model is approximating such a case.
5.2 Human-Agent Coordination
Besides testing the fit of the models of human coordination
that we have proposed, we are also interested in whether
the best fitting model helps us improve outcomes in human-
agent coordination. We use the data from the Thomas ex-
periments to evaluate this possibility. For this task our com-
puter agents implement what we call a “cognitive strategy”.
An agent using the cognitive strategy chooses the action
that maximizes expected utility under an assumption that
the agent’s companion is using the matched p-belief model.
These agents play the humans’ companion player in each of
the four knowledge conditions of the Thomas experiments
(player 1 in all but the Secondary condition). We evaluate
the payoffs from the agents’ actions using the human data
from the Thomas experiments. In this simulation we vary the
payoffs (a, b, c, d), and we assume that the humans would
remain payoff invariant across the range of payoffs that we
use. This assumption is reasonable given that participants in
the Thomas experiments displayed payoff invariance in the
two-agent case. We vary the payoffs according to risk, tak-
ing the payoffs to be (1, 0, p∗, 0) for a particular risk level
p∗ = c−ba−b . As shown in Figure 3, we find that having the
matched p-belief model of human coordination may help
in human-agent coordination. We compared to two baseline
strategies: an agent using a “private heuristic” who always
coordinates if the agent knows x = 1, and an agent using a
“pair heuristic” who always coordinates if the agent knows
that both the agent and the human know x = 1. The private
heuristic achieves good performance for low risk levels, and
the pair heuristic achieves good performance for high risk
levels. The cognitive strategy achieves good performance
at both low and high levels of risk, and only has negative
marginal value over always playing the safe action B at very
high levels of risk.
6 Discussion
In the present paper we focused on laying the groundwork
for using common p-belief in AI and cognitive modeling.
In particular, we developed an efficient algorithm for the in-
ference of maximal perceived common p-belief, we showed
that the coordination strategy of probability matching on
common p-belief explains certain surprising qualitative fea-
tures of existing data from a previous human experiment,
and we showed that this model may also help improve agent
outcomes in human-agent coordination. This work has three
main limitations. Due to the small amount of human data
we had and the lack of a held-out test set, our empirical
results are necessarily only suggestive. While the data are
inconsistent with the rational p-belief model and the iter-
ated maximization model, the predictions of the iterated
matching model and the matched p-belief model are both
reasonably good. The strongest evidence we have favoring
the matched p-belief model is this model’s ability to pro-
duce equal amounts of coordination in the secondary and
tertiary knowledge conditions as well as a low amount with
private knowledge and a high amount with common knowl-
edge. No iterated reasoning model under any formulation
we could find of the Thomas experiments was able to cap-
ture the equality between the two middle conditions while
maintaining good predictions at the extremes. Two other
important limitations of our work are that the coordination
task we consider did not involve intentional communication,
and that the state and action spaces of the task were sim-
ple. While these features allowed us to easily test the predic-
tions of each of our alternative models, it would be interest-
ing to see how the models we considered would compare in
more complex environments. A related interesting direction
for future work is the application of inference of common
p-belief through reasoning about p-evident events to artifi-
cial distributed systems, such as for developing or analyz-
ing bitcoin/blockchain-like protocols, synchronizing remote
servers, or distributed planning in ad hoc multi-robot teams.
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Supplemental Materials
These supplementary sections present the proofs of the
correctness of our algorithms. Our key proofs are self-
contained, but they rely on some preliminary results involv-
ing the structure of p-evident events in finite probability
spaces. We first offer proofs of these preliminary results in
the “Initial Results” section. We then prove that the ratio-
nal p-belief strategy is an equilibrium in the “Models” sec-
tion. Finally, we show the correctness of our algorithm for
computing perceived maximal common p-belief in the “Al-
gorithms” section. This final section also includes our al-
gorithm for computing information partitions from a given
probabilistic generative world model.
All of the proofs are original. Some of the less trivial lem-
mas and propositions may be novel contributions to the lit-
erature on p-evident events. In particular, we know of no
work that explores the structure of what we will call “maxi-
mally evidentC-indicating events”, i.e. maximally p-evident
events in which C is common knowledge at a given state ω.
Our main result along these lines will be that any finite state
space has a unique representation as a nested sequence of
maximally evident C-indicating events. This result is cen-
tral to understanding our algorithm for computing common
p-belief.
S1 Definitions
We first restate the most relevant definitions from our main
text in a clearer format, and we give several additional def-
initions that will be helpful in our proofs. As described in
the main text, we assume a Bayesian game with a finite
state space Ω = {ω1, . . . , ω|Ω|} and information partitions
Π0 and Π1, which are simply partitions of the state space
Ω. The notation Πi(ω) indicates the unique element of Πi
that includes the state ω. These information partitions and
a measure µ defined over Ω induce the conditional distribu-
tion Pi(E |ω) = µ(E |Πi(ω)) =
∑
ω′∈E∩Πi(ω) µ(ω
′)∑
ω′∈Πi(ω) µ(ω
′) , which
specifies the belief about an event E that the player i holds
at state ω.
Definition 1 ((Monderer and Samet 1989)). Player i is said
to p-believe an event E ⊆ Ω at ω if Pi(E |ω) ≥ p.
Definition 2 ((Monderer and Samet 1989)). An event E is
p-evident if for each ω ∈ E, all players p-believe E at ω.
Definition 3. An event E is super-p-evident if for all ω ∈ E
and for all players i, Pi(E |ω) > p.
Definition 4. An event E is said to be a p-evident C-
indicating event if E is a p-evident event and if Pi(C |ω) ≥
p for all i and for all ω ∈ E.
Definition 5 ((Monderer and Samet 1989)). The players
have common p-belief in an event C at state ω if there exists
a p-evident C-indicating event E that includes ω.
Definition 6. An event E is the largest p-evident C-
indicating event (for a particular p) if E is a p-evident C-
indicating event and for all events F , either F is not a p-
evident C-indicating event, or F ⊆ E.
Definition 7. TheC-evidence level of an eventE is the max-
imum value of p for which E is a p-evident C-indicating
event.
Definition 8. An event E is the maximally evident C-
indicating superset of F if there exists a p such that p is
the C-evidence level of E, E is the largest p-evident C-
indicating event, and for all other events G, either G does
not contain F or G has a lower C-evidence level than E.
Definition 9. An event E is the largest super-evident C-
indicating subset of F if there exists a p such that p is the
C-evidence level of F , E is a super-p-evident C-indicating
event, and for all other events G, either G is not a subset of
F , G is a subset of E, or the C-evidence level of G is less
than or equal to p.
S2 Initial Results
Our first result is a simple lemma showing that the family of
p-evident C-indicating events is closed under unions.
Lemma 1. For a given event C, if E and F are p-evident
C-indicating events, then E ∪ F is also a p-evident C-
indicating event.
Proof. Consider ω ∈ E ∪ F . For any player i, Pi(E ∪
F |ω) ≥ min(Pi(E |ω), Pi(F |ω)) ≥ p (since E and F
are p-evident). Therefore E ∪ F is p-evident. Now suppose
ω ∈ E. In this case Pi(C |ω) ≥ p since E is C-indicating.
But also, if ω ∈ F , then Pi(C |ω) ≥ p since F is C-
indicating. Therefore E ∪ F is C-indicating.
Our next result is an immediate corollary and estab-
lishes the existence and uniqueness of largest p-evident C-
indicating events for any p.
Corollary 1. For a given event C, if there exists a p-evident
C-indicating event E, then there exists a unique largest p-
evident C-indicating event.
Proof. Assume there exists a p-evident C-indicating event.
Take F to be the set of all p-evident C-indicating events.
By lemma 1, the set G = ∪F∈FF consisting of the union
of all of these events is also a p-evident C-indicating event.
Therefore G is a p-evident C-indicating event containing all
other p-evident C-indicating events. Moreover, E must be
unique since it contains all other p-evident events that indi-
cate C.
The next lemma establishes a containment relationship
between largest p-evident C-indicating events associated
with different values of p.
Lemma 2. For a given event C, if E is the largest p-
evident C-indicating event, and F is the largest p′-evident
C-indicating event, with p ≥ p′, then E ⊆ F .
Proof. Suppose E is the largest p-evident C-indicating
event. Since p′ ≤ p, E is also a p′-evident C-indicating
event. Thus E must be contained by the largest p′-evident
C-indicating event.
We now show that a unique maximally evident C-
indicating event exists around any subset of Ω.
Lemma 3. For a given event C, and for any event E, there
exists a unique maximally evident C-indicating superset of
E.
Proof. Consider an event E. The C-evidence level of E
is given by p = mini∈[0,1],ω∈E min(Pi(E |ω), Pi(C |ω)),
and therefore exists. Moreover, since E is a p-evident C-
indicating event, E must be contained by the unique largest
p-evidentC-indicating event F (which is guaranteed to exist
by corollary 1). Further, by definition F must also contain all
other p-evident supersets of E, and therefore F is the maxi-
mally evident C-indicating superset of E.
The following lemma, which will be useful in proving our
main theoretical result, shows that the family of maximally
evident C-indicating events is highly constrained.
Lemma 4. For a given eventC, for any eventE, there exists
some ω ∈ E such that the maximally evident C-indicating
superset ofE is equal to the maximally evident C-indicating
superset of {ω}.
Proof. Let F be the maximally evident C-indicating super-
set of E, guaranteed to exist by lemma 3. Let pF be the C-
evidence level of F . Consider an ω ∈ E. LetGω be the max-
imally evident C-indicating superset of {ω}, and let pGω be
the C-evidence level of Gω . We must have that pGω ≥ pF
for all ω (Since F contains ω, pF > pGω would violate the
fact that Gω is maximally evident.) Suppose pGω > pF for
all ω. Then, by lemma 1, H = ∪ω∈EGω would be a pH -
evident C-indicating event with pH ≥ minω pGω > pF .
However, H clearly contains E, and thus pH > pF vio-
lates the fact that F is the maximally evident C-indicating
superset of E. Therefore, there must exist some ω such that
pGω = pF . Since largest p-evident C-indicating events are
unique by corollary 1, we must have H = Gω .
The following theorem is our main theoretical result,
and drives the correctness of our algorithms. This theorem,
which is also illustrated in Figure S1, states that any finite
Ω has a unique representation as a nested sequence of maxi-
mally evident C-indicating events. The efficiency of our al-
gorithm stems from only searching through this sequence of
subsets, rather than all possible subsets, in order to compute
common p-belief at any state ω.
Theorem 1. Given an information structure
(Ω, µ, (Π0,Π1)) with |Ω| < ∞ and any event C ⊆ Ω,
let F = {E′1, . . . , E′n} be the set of maximally evident
C-indicating events of Ω, i.e. the set of events E′i for which
there exists some F ⊆ Ω such that E′i is the maximally
evident C-indicating superset of F . F can be ordered into a
nested sequence of subsets, E1 ⊃ E2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ En such that
Ei is the largest super-evident C-indicating subset event of
Ei−1 for any i > 1.
Proof. We prove this theorem by construction. We know
from lemma 3 that for each ωj ∈ Ω, there exists a maxi-
mally evident C-indicating superset of {ωj}. We label this
eventE′ωj . Lemma 4 implies that collection of events {E′ωj :
ωj ∈ Ω} is equal to F , the entire set of maximally evident
C-indicating events. We also know from lemma 3 that each
E′ωj is associated with a particular C-evidence level, which
we will label pωj . Without loss of generality, we can assume
that the index j sorts these C-evidence levels by their mag-
nitudes. This produces a finite non-decreasing sequence of
values in [0, 1]: pω1 ≤ pω2 ≤ . . . ≤ pω|Ω| . By lemma
2 the events E′ωj thus form a nested sequence of subsets:
E′ω1 ⊇ E′ω2 ⊇ . . . ⊇ E′ω|Ω| . We can collapse the events
that are equal to each other to arrive at a sequence of strict
subsets: E1 ⊃ E2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ En.
Now consider Ei for some i > 1. By construction Ei is
a super-pωi−1 -evident C-indicating event, and Ei ⊂ Ei−1.
Now take F to be another super-pωi−1 -evident C-indicating
event, and let pF be the C-evidence level of F . If pF ≥
pωi , then we must have Ei ⊇ F by lemma 2 since Ei is
the largest pωi -evident event. Now suppose pF < pωi , so
pωi−1 < pF < pωi . Let G be the maximally evident C-
indicating superset of F , and let pG be the C-evidence level
of G. Clearly pG ≥ pF , and by construction we must also
have pG = pωj since F contains all maximally evident C-
indicating supersets, and hence G = Ej , for some j. But
since pωj = pG ≥ pF > pωi−1 , we must have j ≥ i, and
so F ⊆ G = Ej ⊆ Ei. Therefore again F ⊆ Ei. Hence Ei
must be the largest C-indicating subset of Ei−1.
The following corollary to this theorem provides the basis
for our iterative algorithm.
Corollary 2. Given a maximally evident C-indicating event
E, either there exists a unique largest super-evident C-
indicating subset of E, or no super-p-evident C-indicating
subsets exist.
Proof. Since E is a maximally evident C-indicating event,
E is equal to some Ei in the sequence F given by theorem
1. Therefore, if i < n, Ei+1 is the unique largest super-
evident C-indicating subset of E or no such subsets exist, as
indicated in theorem 1.
Finally, we have four technical lemmas that will be use-
ful for analyzing our specific algorithms and player strate-
gies. The first lemma is a simple constraint on belief about
p-evident events that follows from how information parti-
tions work.
Lemma 5. For any p-evident event E, either Pi(E |ω) = 0
or Pi(E |ω) ≥ p for all ω and for all i.
Proof. If Pi(E |ω) > 0, then there must exist an ω′ ∈ Π(ω)
such that ω′ ∈ E. Since E is p-evident, then Pi(E |ω′) ≥
p. But then since Πi(ω) = Πi(ω′) by the definition of
an information partition, Pi(E |ω) = µ(E |Πi(ω)) =
µ(E |Πi(ω′)) = Pi(E |ω′), and hence Pi(E |ω) ≥ p.
The second lemma connects the containment relation-
ships between p-evident events to the relationship between
beliefs about those events.
Lemma 6. If player i p-believes a p-evident C-indicating
event, then player i p-believes the largest p-evident C-
indicating event.
ω	  
Figure S1: Any finite state space can be uniquely represented as a nested sequence of maximally evident C-indicating events.
The diagram in this figure represents the generative process of the messenger described in the main text of our paper (with
δ = 0.25). Each contiguous rectangle of blocks represents a state in Ω, and the measure of the state is given by the area of
the rectangle. States that are shaded are members of C = {ω ∈ Ω : x(ω) = 1}. The solid lines between states represent the
information partition of player 0, while the the dotted lines represent that of player 1. Two states belong to the same element
of a player’s information partition if they are connected by some path in the graph induced by that player’s edges. Self-loops
indicate that a player has no uncertainty about the state when the state obtains. The four nested ovals are the four maximally
evident C-indicating events in this state space (F in theorem 1), and the grey shading in the ovals represents the C-evidence
levels of those events (0, 0.25, 0.5, and 1.0). Our algorithm iterates over these maximally evident events rather than over all
possible events, and at ω for player i returns the C-evidence level associated with the last such event containing some element
of Πi(ω). For instance, at the circled state the algorithm will find the third nested event for player 0 and the second for player 1.
Proof. Let F be a p-evident C-indicating event and let E be
the largest p-evident C-indicating event. Since E is largest,
F ⊆ E, so we must have Pi(E |ω) = Pi(E ∪ F |ω) ≥
Pi(F |ω). Hence if i p-believes F , i must also p-believe E.
The next lemma states that p-belief is transitive.
Lemma 7. If player i p-believes F at all elements of an
event E, and player i p-believes G at all elements of F , then
player i p-believes G at all elements of E.
Proof. Let ω be an element of E. Since i p-believes F at ω,
Pi(F |w) ≥ p. Therefore we must have some ω′ ∈ Πi(ω)∩
F . Since player i p-believes G at all states in F , we must
have Pi(G |ω′) ≥ p. By the definition of an information
partition, we must then also have Pi(G |ω) = Pi(G |ω′) ≥
p. Hence player i p-believes G at all ω ∈ E.
The final lemma states, roughly, that with regard to p-
evident events a player’s beliefs about another player cannot
be too inconsistent with the first player’s own beliefs.
Lemma 8. If player i p-believes that player 1− i p-believes
the largest p-evident C-indicating event E, and player i p-
believes C, then player i must p-believe E.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary ω ∈ Ω and an arbitrary p.
Take the largest p-evident C-indicating event E. Suppose
at ω player i p-believes that player 1 − i p-believes E, and
player i p-believes C. To generate the first belief, there must
be an element of the information partition of player 1 − i,
T ∈ Π1−i, such that P1−i(E |T ) ≥ p, and another set of
states S ⊆ Πi(ω) ∩ T such that Pi(S |ω) ≥ p. But then,
since states within a player’s information partition are in-
distinguishable and since S ⊆ Πi(ω) ∩ T , we must have
for all ω′ ∈ S, P1−i(E |ω′) = P1−i(E |T ) ≥ p and
Pi(S |ω′) = Pi(S |ω) ≥ p. Therefore, since E is p-evident,
S ∪E is also a p-evident event (if ω′′ ∈ S, then player 1− i
p-believes E and player i p-believes S, while if ω′′ ∈ E,
then both players p-believe E). Moreover, since player i p-
believesC at ω (and therefore at Π(ω) and S) and since 1−i
p-believes C at E (and hence at S by lemma 7), then both
players p-believe C at all states in S ∪ E. Therefore S ∪ E
is a p-evident C-indicating event (and, moreover, player i p-
believes S ∪E at ω since player i p-believes S at ω). But E
was assumed to be the largest p-evident C-indicating event,
so we must have S ∪ E = E. Hence player i p-believes
E.
S3 Models
Strategic Coordination
In this section we show the rational p-belief strategy forms
an equilibrium in the coordination game we study. Recall the
rational p-belief strategy is that player i plays actionA if and
only if player i believes with at least probability p∗ = c−ba−b
that both players have common p∗-belief that x = 1.
Proposition 1. Assuming noiseless messages and assuming
p∗ > µ(x = 1), the rational p-belief strategy maximizes the
expected return of player i at every ω ∈ Ω, given player 1−i
also uses the same strategy.
Proof. Suppose that messages are noiseless, i.e. Pi(x =
1 |ω) > Pi(x = 1) ⇒ Pi(x = 1 |ω) = 1 for all ω. Take
ω ∈ Ω.
Take F to be some p∗-evident (x = 1)-indicating event.
Take E to be the largest such event. Suppose player i p∗-
believes F . By lemma 6, player i also p∗-believes E. By
the definition of p-evident events, for any ω′ ∈ E, we
must then have that player 1 − i also p∗-believes E at ω′.
Therefore by lemma 7 player i also p∗-believes that player
1 − i p∗-believes E. Since player 1 − i is assumed to be
using the rational p-belief strategy, player i therefore p∗-
believes player 1 − i will play A. Since we have assumed
p∗ > Pi(x = 1) and messages are noiseless, we must have
Pi(x = 1 |Πi(ω)) = 1. Then the expected return for i of
playingAmust be at least p∗·a+(1−p∗)b = c−ba−ba+ a−ca−bb =
c. Therefore, playingAmaximizes player i’s expected return
(and if player i p′-believes a p′-evident (x = 1)-indicating
event, p′ > p∗, then the expected return from A is strictly
greater than for B).
Now suppose player i p∗-believes x = 1 but that there
is no p∗-evident (x = 1)-indicating event F such that
Pi(F |ω) ≥ p∗. TakeE to be the largest p∗-evident (x = 1)-
indicating event. Then player i cannot p∗-believe that player
1 − i p∗-believes E (since otherwise player i would p∗-
believe E by lemma 8). Thus, since player 1− i is assumed
to be using the rational p-belief strategy, player i believes
with probability at most p′ < p∗ that player 1 − i will play
A. Then since p′ ·a+ (1−p′)b < p∗ ·a+ (1−p∗)b = c, the
expected utility from playing A to player i is less than from
playing B. (And if i does not p∗-believe x = 1, the same
arithmetic holds.)
S4 Algorithms
Computing Information Partitions
In this section we state the simple algorithm for converting
the generative process descriptions of the probabilistic mod-
els in our main text to information partitions. The “run(i,
ω)” function takes as input a player i and a state ω ex-
pressed as a tuple, uses the variables in the tuple for each
random draw within the generative process, and returns a
composition of the observe calls for player i (For example,
run(0, (1,1,0,1,0)) would return [(1),(0,0)] in the messenger
model). Our algorithm groups together states with the same
observations into elements of the information partitions.
Computing Common p-Belief
We now prove the correctness of the common p belief algo-
rithm given in the main text. We first prove a lemma stating
the correctness of the super p evident algorithm.
Lemma 9. AssumingE is a maximally evidentC-indicating
event, and assuming p is the C-evidence level of E, then the
set returned by evaluating “super p evident(E, p)” is the
Algorithm 5 information partition(i)
partition := dict()
for ω ∈ Ω do
obs := run(i, ω)
if obs ∈ partition then
partitions[obs].append(ω)
else
partitions[obs] := [ω]
return partitions
largest super-evident C-indicating subset of E, or the empty
set if and only if such an event does not exist.
Proof. First note that from the condition in the “if” state-
ment of the function, all states that remain in E when the
function returns will have the properties Pi(E |ω) > p and
Pi(C |ω) > p. Therefore, the function only returns super-
p-evident C-indicating subsets of E (and since p is the C-
evidence level of E, strict subsets must be returned), or the
empty set if no super-p-evident subsets exists. Next, note
that the “while” loop only removes elements of E that can-
not belong to the largest super-evident C-indicating subset
of E, if such an event exists. We can see this by induction
on the items removed. Suppose that the first ω removed be-
longed to F , the largest super-evident C-indicating subset
of E. Then we would have Pi(F |ω) > p since F must be
super-p-evident. But since F ⊆ E, by lemma 2 we would
then also have Pi(E |ω) > p, which contradicts the fact
that ω was removed. Now assume that the first k elements
removed do not belong to F , and let E′ be the set E mi-
nus those elements. Then suppose the (k + 1)st element
removed, if it exists, belonged to F . Since all the previ-
ous elements removed did not belong to F by the induc-
tive assumption, F ⊆ E′. But then analogous to the base
case, the (k + 1)st element, ωk+1, belonging to F implies
Pi(E
′ |ωk+1) > p, which contradicts the fact that this ele-
ment was removed. Therefore this function returns exactly
the largest super-evident C-indicating subset of E. Finally,
since Ω is assumed to be finite, and at least one element ofE
is removed in each iteration of the while loop, the function
must terminate.
Lastly, we show the correctness of our main algorithm.
Proposition 2. The value returned by evaluating “com-
mon p belief(C, i, ω)” is the C-evidence level of the maxi-
mally evidentC-indicating eventE containing some element
of Πi(ω).
Proof. First note “evidence level(F, C)” computes the C-
evidence level of F (which must exist by lemma 3). Also
note Ω is the maximally evident C-indicating superset of Ω.
Thus by lemma 9, the calls to “super p evident()” iteratively
return the nested sequence of subsets of maximally evident
subsets described in theorem 1.
If there does not exist a p-evident C-indicating event for
p > 0, then by lemma 9 the first call to super p evident will
return the empty set. In this case the C-evidence level of Ω
will be 0, and hence the function will return 0.
Since the “while” loop will continue iterating until either
F is empty or F is an event that player i believes to be im-
possible (i.e., that does not contain any elements in Πi(ω)),
the last E before either of these cases occurred must be the
maximally evident C-indicating event containing some ele-
ment of Πi(ω). The call to evidence level then computes the
C-evidence level of E.
Our final result interprets the last result in terms of
common-p-belief.
Corollary 3. The value returned by evaluating “com-
mon p belief(C, i, ω)” is the maximum value of p such that
player i p-believes there is common-p-belief in C at ω.
Proof. By proposition 2, common p belief(C, i, ω) returns
the C-evidence level of some event E that player i believes
with probability greater than 0. Let p equal the C-evidence
level of E. By lemma 5, player i must therefore p-believe
E. Player i thus p-believes there is common-p-belief in C
at ω since E is a p-evident C-indicating event. Now sup-
pose there was some p′ > p such that player i p′-believes
that there is common-p′-belief in C. Then by definition of
common-p-belief there must exist a p′-evident event F that
player i p′-believes. But then player i must also p′-believe
the maximally evident C-indicating superset of F . How-
ever, this contradicts the fact that p was returned by com-
mon p belief(C, i, ω), since if player i p′-believes F , then
F is a maximally evident event containing some element of
Πi(ω).
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